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Strategic Supply Function Competition 





A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private 
information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and 
in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of 
the information structure: supply functions are steeper with more noise in the private signals 
or more correlation among the costs parameters. In fact, for large values of noise or 
correlation supply functions are downward sloping, margins are larger than the Cournot ones, 
and as we approach the common value case they tend to the collusive level. Furthermore, 
competition in supply functions aggregates the dispersed information of firms (the 
equilibrium is privately revealing) while Cournot competition does not. The implication is 
that with the former the only source of deadweight loss is market power while with the latter 
we have to add private information. As the market grows large the equilibrium becomes 
competitive and we obtain an approximation to how many competitors are needed to have a 
certain degree of competitiveness. 
JEL Code: L13, D44, D82, L94. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition in supply functions has been used to model several markets, in particular the 
spot market for electricity but also management consulting or airline pricing reservation 
systems. The models considered typically do not allow for private information.1 Private 
information on costs is a relevant situation in many instances where it is not realistic to 
assume that there is common knowledge on costs. Instead each firm has an estimate of its 
own costs and uses it, together with whatever public information is available, to make 
inferences about the costs of rivals. In this paper we study supply function competition 
when firms have private information about costs and compare it with Cournot 
competition, a leading modeling contender. Our aim is to explore the impact of private 
information on price-cost margins, competitiveness, and welfare. 
 
Competition in supply schedules has been studied in the absence of uncertainty by 
Grossman (1981) and Hart (1985) showing a great multiplicity of equilibria. A similar 
result is obtained by Wilson (1979) in a share auction model. Back and Zender (1993) 
and Kremer and Nyborg (2004) obtain related results for Treasury auctions. Some of the 
equilibria can be very collusive. 2  Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show how adding 
uncertainty in the supply function model can reduce the range of equilibria and even pin 
down a unique equilibrium provided the uncertainty has unbounded support.3 In this case 
the supply function equilibrium always lies between the Cournot and competitive 
(Bertrand) outcomes. Kyle (1989) introduces private information into a double auction 
for a risky asset of unknown liquidation value and derives a unique symmetric linear 
Bayesian equilibrium in demand schedules when traders have constant absolute risk 
aversion, there is noise trading, and uncertainty is normally distributed.  
 
                                                 
1   Exceptions are the empirical papers of Hortaçsu and Puller (2006) and Kühn and Machado (2004) in 
electricity. 
2   Back and Zender (2001) and LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) show how the auction can be designed to limit 
those collusive equilibria. 
3   In a linear-quadratic model this is a linear equilibrium.   2
The modeling strategy in this paper is to consider linear-quadratic payoffs coupled with 
an affine information structure, which admits common or private values, that yields a 
unique symmetric linear Bayesian supply function equilibrium (LBSFE). We do not need 
to introduce noise in the system. The characterization of a linear equilibrium with supply 
function competition when there is market power and private information needs some 
careful analysis in order to model the capacity of a firm to influence the market price at 
the same time that the firm learns from the price. Kyle (1989) pioneered this type of 
analysis in a financial market context introducing noise trading in order to prevent the 
market from collapsing.  
 
It is found that there is a unique LBSFE except in the pure common value case. This 
equilibrium is privately revealing. That is, the private information of a firm and the price 
provide a sufficient statistic of the joint information in the market. This means in 
particular that the incentives to acquire information are preserved despite the fact that the 
price aggregates information. We do not examine possible nonlinear equilibria. Linear 
equilibria are tractable, in particular in the presence of private information, and have 
desirable properties like simplicity.  
 
In the linear equilibrium supply functions are upward sloping provided that the 
informative role of price does not overwhelm its traditional capacity as index of scarcity. 
This happens when costs shocks are not very correlated and information precision not too 
low. In this case an increase in the correlation of cost parameters or in the noise in private 
signals makes supply functions steeper. Firms are more cautious when they see a price 
raise since it may mean that costs are high. The market looks less competitive in those 
circumstances as reflected in increased price-cost margins. Ignoring private cost 
information with supply function competition may therefore overestimate the slope of 
supply. This is not the case with Cournot competition, where competitiveness and the 
margin are not affected by the information parameters. When the information role of the 
price dominates its index of scarcity capacity supply functions slope downwards and 
margins are larger than the Cournot ones. This is in contrast of the results in Kyle (1989), 
and also in Wang and Zender (2002), where demand schedules always slope downwards.   3
The result implies, in particular, that –in contrast with Klemperer and Meyer (1989)– 
margins with supply function competition can be higher than the Cournot level. More 
surprisingly perhaps, as we approach the common value case margins tend to the 
collusive level. This happens at the unique linear equilibrium only for informational 
reasons and not because of the existence of a vast multiplicity of equilibria. Relaxation of 
competition due to adverse selection in a common value environment is also obtained in 
Biais et al. (2000). 
 
A welfare optimal allocation can be implemented by a price-taking Bayesian supply 
function equilibrium. This is so since at a LBSFE there is a deadweight loss only because 
of market power since the equilibrium is privately revealing. Typically the deadweight 
loss increases as we approach the common value case as long as signals are noisy. The 
welfare evaluation of the LBSFE is in marked contrast with the Cournot equilibrium in 
the presence of private information. The reason is that the LBSFE aggregates information 
and therefore, as stated, there is only a deadweight loss due to market power but not due 
to private information. The result is that in a large market with supply function 
competition there is no efficiency loss (in the limit) and the order of magnitude of the 
deadweight loss is 
2 1/n  where n is the number of firms (and the size of the market as 
well). This is also the rate of convergence to efficiency obtained in a double auction 
context by Cripps and Swinkels (2006). The welfare analysis in the supply function 
model contrasts thus with the one in models where there is no endogenous public signal 
such as the Cournot market in Vives (1988), the beauty contest in Morris and Shin 
(2002), or the general linear-quadratic set up of Angeletos and Pavan (2007). With 
Cournot competition we have to add a deadweight loss due to private information. A 
large Cournot market does not aggregate information (i.e. a large Cournot market does 
not approach a full information competitive outcome) and in the limit there is a welfare 
loss due to private information.  
 
A leading application of the model, as we will see in the next section, is to wholesale 
electricity markets. The model admits also other interpretations. The cost shock could be 
related to some ex post pollution or emissions damage which is assessed on the firm.   4
Before submitting its supply schedule a firm would receive some private information on 
this pollution damage. Still another interpretation of the shock would be a random 
opportunity cost of serving the market which is related to dynamic considerations. 
Revenue management deals with situations where the product, be it a hotel room, airline 
flight, generated electricity or tickets for a concert, has an expiration date and capacity is 
fixed well in advance and can be added only at high marginal cost.4 The problem arises 
then of predicting the opportunity cost of sale (the value of a unit in a shortage situation). 
A high opportunity cost is an indication of high value of sales in the future. In this case a 
firm would have a private assessment of the opportunity cost with which it would place 
its supply schedule. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the application to electricity 
markets. Section 3 presents the supply function model with strategic firms and 
characterizes a linear Bayesian supply function equilibrium and its comparative static and 
welfare properties. Section 4 performs a welfare analysis (including a comparison with 
Bayesian Cournot equilibria). Section 5 characterizes the convergence to price-taking 
behavior as the market grows large. It provides also an analysis of the order of magnitude 
of deadweight losses. Concluding remarks, including potential policy implications, close 
the paper. All proofs and the analysis of the Bayesian Cournot model are gathered in the 
Appendix.  
 
2. Application to electricity markets 
A potential application of the model is to competition in the electricity spot market. In 
quite a few spot markets firms submit supply schedules in a day-ahead pool market which 
is organized as a uniform price multiunit auction. In the British Pool, the first liberalized 
wholesale market, generators had to submit a single supply schedule for the entire day. 
The schedules are increasing since the Pool’s rules rank plants in order of increasing bids. 
Other wholesale markets have different rules (the British Pool was replaced by NETA in 
                                                 
4   Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) for the basics of revenue management.   5
2001).
5
  In our modeling the supply functions are smooth (the old English pool was 
modeled like this by Green and Newbery (1992) and Green (1996, 1999)) while typically 
supplies are discrete. However the modeling of the auction with discrete supplies leads to 
existence problems of equilibrium in pure strategies (see von der Fehr and Harbord 
(1993)). The linear supply function model has been widely used in electricity markets and 
new developments include cost asymmetries, capacity constraints, piecewise affine 
supply functions and non-negativity generation constraints (see Baldick, Grant, and Kahn 
(2004) and Rudkevich (2005)). 
 
Both strategic behavior and private information are relevant in electricity markets. There 
is ample evidence by now that firms bid over marginal costs (see, e.g. Borenstein and 
Bushnell (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002), Green and Newbery (1992), and Wolfram 
(1998)). Hortaçsu and Puller (2006) introduce private information on the contract 
positions of firms in the Texas balancing market (the day-ahead market is resolved with 
bilateral contracts).6 Information on costs is available because the balancing market takes 
place very close to the generation moment and from information sellers. Kühn and 
Machado (2004) introduce private information on retail sales in their study of vertically 
integrated firms in the Spanish pool. Private cost information related to plant availability 
will be relevant when there is a day-ahead market organized as a pool where firms submit 
hourly or daily supply schedules.7 Indeed, plant availability is random, and the firm has 
privileged information because of technical issues or transport problems; hydro 
availability in the reservoirs of each firm is private information; the terms of supply 
                                                 
5   In the day-ahead market in the Spanish pool generators submit supply functions which have to be 
nondecreasing and can include up to 25 price-quantity pairs for each production unit, as well as some 
other ancillary conditions. The demand side can bid in a similar way and the market operator 
constructs a merit order dispatch by ordering in the natural way supply and demand bids. The 
intersection of the demand and supply schedules determines the (uniform) price. Once the market 
closes the system operator solves congestion problems and market participants may adjust their 
positions in a sequence of intra-day markets, which have similar clearing procedures as in the day-
ahead market. (See Crampes and Fabra (2005).) 
6   The authors also argue that to take a linear approximation to marginal costs in the Texas electricity 
market is reasonable. 
7   Note that even if there was a market for information on costs the solution of the model with private 
information would yield the value of information.   6
contracts for energy inputs or imports are also private information. The latter include 
constraints in take-or-pay contracts for gas where the marginal cost of gas is zero until 
the constraint –typically private information to the firm– binds, or price of transmission 
rights in electricity imports depending on the private arrangements for the use of a 
congested interconnector. (It is worth noting that even if the opportunity costs of the 
inputs are the prices of those inputs in international markets in many instances there is 
not a single reference market.) Furthermore, in an emission rights system, future rights 
allocations may depend on current emissions and firms may have different private 
estimates of such allocation. This will affect the opportunity cost of using current 
emission rights. 
 
There is a lively debate about the best way of modeling competition in the wholesale 
electricity market. The Cournot framework has been used in a variety of studies.8 The 
advantage of the Cournot model is that it is a robust model in which capacity constraints 
and fringe suppliers are easily incorporated. A drawback is that the Cournot model tends 
to predict prices that are too high given realistic estimates of the demand elasticity.9 The 
supply function approach is more realistic but potentially less robust. There is either non-
existence of equilibrium in pure strategies if discrete supplies are taken into account or, 
as stated before, a plethora of equilibria in smooth models with no uncertainty. Baldick 
and Hogan (2006) justify to concentrate attention on linear supply function equilibria in a 
linear-quadratic model because other equilibria (in the range between the least 
competitive Cournot one and the most competitive) are unstable. A potential advantage 
of the supply function approach, over either the Cournot or the pure auction approaches, 




                                                 
8   See, for example, Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) for the US; Alba et al. (1999) and Ramos et. al. 
(1998) for Spain; and Andersson and Bergman (1995) for Scandinavia. 
9   However, including vertical relations and contracts in a Cournot setting provides better estimates (see 
Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2008)).   7
3. A strategic supply function model 
Consider a market for a homogenous product with n consumers, each with quasilinear 
preferences and having the net benefit function  
 
() Ux p x −  with  ( )
2 Ux x x/ 2 =α −β , 
 
where αand β are positive parameters and x the consumption level. This gives rise to 
the inverse demand  () n PX X / n =α−β  where X is total output. In the electricity market 
example the demand intercept α   is a continuous function of time (load-duration 
characteristic) that yields the variation of demand over the time horizon considered. At 
any time there is a fixed α and the market clears. 
 
There are n firms in the market also. We are considering thus an n-replica market and 
X/n is the average or per capita output. We will denote the average of a variable by a 




ii i i i Cx; x x
2
λ θ= θ +  
 
where  i θ   is a random parameter and λ > 0. Total surplus is therefore given by 
() () ii i TS nU X/n C x , =− θ ∑   and per capita surplus by 
() () ( ) ii i TS/n U X/n C x , /n =− θ ∑ .  
 
As we will see below, this replica market can also be interpreted as a market 
parameterized by the number of consumers and where firms can enter freely paying a 
positive fixed entry cost. Then the free entry number of firms is of the order of the 
number of consumers. A large market is a market with a large number of consumers. We 
will consider in the paper the reduced-form replica market version instead of the free-
entry version.    8
 
We assume that  i θ   is normally distributed (with mean  0 θ > and variance 
2
θ σ ). The 
parameters i θ  and  j θ , j≠ i, are correlated with correlation coefficient  [ ] 0,1 ρ∈ . So we 
have 
2
ij cov , θ ⎡⎤ θθ = ρ σ ⎣⎦ , for j≠ i. Firm i receives a signal  ii i s = θ+ ε and signals are of the 
same precision with  i ε normally distributed with  i E0 ⎡⎤ ε = ⎣⎦  and  [ ]
2
i var ε ε= σ . Error 
terms in the signals are uncorrelated among themselves and with the  i θ parameters. All 
random variables are thus normally distributed. 
 
In the electricity example the random cost shock may be linked to plant availability 
because of technical issues or transport problems. Other shocks that may be private 
information to the firm are related to the level of hydro water in the reservoirs of the firm 
and the terms of the supply contracts for energy inputs or imports. Those terms are 
typically, at least partially, private information to the firm. This is so even if the 
opportunity costs of the contracted inputs are the prices of those inputs traded in 
international markets because there is not always a single reference market. The common 
component in the shock may be related to the prices of energy in international markets to 
which the supply contracts of firms are linked. Furthermore, the constraints in take-or-
pay contracts for gas imply that the marginal cost of gas is zero until the constraint is hit. 
The point is that the level of the constraint is private information to the firm. For 
electricity imports, the price of transmission rights in electricity imports is also private 
information to the firm (for example, depending on the arrangements to use an 
interconnector subject to congestion). Finally, the internalization of costs of emission 
rights may depend on the private assessment of future rights allocations. 
 
As stated in the introduction the cost shock could be also related to some ex post 
pollution or emission damage which is assessed on the firm and for which the firm has 
some private information. Another interpretation of the shock is a random opportunity 
cost of serving the market which is related to dynamic considerations (e.g. revenue 
management on the face of products with expiration date and costly capacity changes). 
   9
Ex-ante, before uncertainty is realized, all firms face the same prospects. It follows that 
the average parameter  ()
n
ni i1 /n
= θ≡ θ ∑    is normally distributed with mean θ , 
() ()
2
n var 1 n 1 /n θ ⎡⎤ θ=+−ρ σ ⎣⎦
 , and  ni n cov , var ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ θ θ= θ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 .  
 
Our information structure encompasses the cases of “common value” and of “private 
values”. For  1 ρ=  the θ parameters are perfectly correlated and we are in a common value 
model. When signals are perfect,  2 0 ε σ =  for all i, and 0 1 <ρ< , we will say we are in a 
private values model. Agents receive idiosyncratic shocks, which are imperfectly 
correlated, and each agent observes his shock with no measurement error. When  0 ρ = , 
the parameters are independent, and we are in an independent values model.  
 
Let  ()
222 / θθε ξ≡σ σ +σ  , it is not difficult to see that 
 
() ii i Es s1 ⎡⎤ θ= ξ + − ξ θ ⎣⎦  and  ( ) ji ji i Ess E s s 1 ⎡⎤⎡⎤ = θ = ξρ + −ξρ θ ⎣⎦⎣⎦ . 
 
When signals are perfect,  1 ξ=  and  ii i Ess ⎡⎤ θ = ⎣⎦, and  () ji i Es s 1 ⎡⎤ θ =ρ + −ρ θ ⎣⎦ . When 
they are not informative,  0 ξ=  and  ii ji EsEs ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ θ =θ = θ ⎣⎦⎣⎦.  
 
Under the normality assumption conditional expectations are affine. There are other 
families of conjugate prior and likelihood that also yield affine conditional expectations 
and allow for bounded supports of the distributions. (See Vives (Ch. 2, 1999)).10 
 
Firms compete in supply functions. We will restrict attention to symmetric Linear 
Bayesian Supply Function Equilibrium (LBSFE). The characterization of an equilibrium 
with supply function competition when there is market power and private information 
                                                 
10    With normal distributions there is positive probability that prices and quantities are negative in 
equilibrium. This can be controlled by choice of the variances of the distributions and the parameters 
α , β ,  λ and  θ .    10
needs to model the capacity of a firm to influence the market price at the same time that 
the firm learns from the price.  
 
The strategy for firm i is a price contingent schedule  ( ) i Xs , ⋅ . This is a map from the 
signal space to the space of supply functions. Given the strategies of firms  () j Xs, ⋅ , j = 1, 
…, n, for given realizations of signals market clearing implies that  
( ) ( )
n
nj j=1 pP X s , p = ∑ . 
Let us assume that there is a unique market clearing price  ( )( ) ( ) 1n ˆ p X s , ,...,X s , ⋅ ⋅  for any 
realizations of the signals.
11
  Then profits for firm i, for any given realization of the 
signals, are given by  
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) i1 n i i X s , ,...,X s , pX s ,p C X s ,p π⋅ ⋅ = −  
 
where  () () () 1n ˆ p p X s , ,...,X s , =⋅ ⋅ . This defines a game in supply functions and we want 
to characterize a symmetric LBSFE. Let us posit a candidate symmetric equilibrium for 
the game with n firms:  
 
( ) ni n n i n Xs , p b a s c p =− + . 
 
Average output is given by  nn n n n xba sc p =− +   , where  ( ) () ni ni ii ss n n == θ + ε ∑ ∑   . 
Substituting in the inverse demand  n px = α−β and solving for p we obtain  
() ( )
1
nn n n p1c b a s
− =+ β α − β+ β , 
 
where we posit that  n 1c0 +β > .  
 
Given the strategies of rivals  ( ) nj Xs , ⋅ , j ≠ i, firm i faces a residual inverse demand 
 
() () ( ) nj i n n n n j i ji ji pX s , p x n 1 b c p a s x
nn n n n
≠ ≠
ββ β β β
=α− − =α− − + + − ∑∑ . 
                                                 
11   If there is no market clearing price assume the market shuts down and if there are many then the one 
that maximizes volume is chosen.   11
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−ββ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =+ β α − − + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∑ .12 
 
All the information provided by the price to firm i about the signals of others is subsumed 
in the intercept of residual demand i I . The information available to firm i is therefore 
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+λ > ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎝⎠
. An 
equilibrium must fulfill also n 1c0 +β > . The following proposition characterizes the linear 
equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
12   Note that if 
n 1c0 +β >  then 
nn n
n1
1c 1 c c / n 0
n
−
+β =+ β −β >  (either if 
n c0 >  or 
n c0 < ).   12
Proposition 1. In the n-firm market with ρ < 1 and 
22
εθ σ σ< ∞ / , there is a unique 
symmetric linear Bayesian supply function equilibrium. It is given by  
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and  n c  is the largest solution to the quadratic equation 
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2
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1
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−ρ σ + + − ρ σ
. In equilibrium we have that n 1c0 +β > , 
n a0 > , and  n c  decreases with  n M  with  n c0 >  for  n M0 = . 
 
Proof: See Appendix I.  
 
 
The price  n p  reveals the aggregate information n s  . The equilibrium is privately revealing 
(i.e. for firm i () i s,p  or () in s,s    is a sufficient statistic of the joint information in the 
market, see Allen (1981)). The incentives to collect information are preserved because for 
firm i the signal  i s  still helps in estimating  i θ  even though  n p r e v e a l sn s  .  
 
Some extreme cases 
The equilibrium is in contrast with the pure common value model of Kyle (1989) where 
noise traders or noisy supply are needed in order to prevent the collapse of the market. In 
our model there is no noise and consequently in the pure common value case ( 1 ρ =    13
and
2
ε σ< ∞ ) the market collapses. Indeed, when  1 ρ =  and 
2
ε σ <∞ a fully revealing REE is 
not implementable and there is no linear equilibrium. The reason should be well 
understood: if the price reveals the common value then no firm has an incentive to put any 
weight on its signal (and the incentives to acquire information disappear as well). But if 
firms put no weight on their signals then the price can not contain any information on the 
costs parameters.  As 1 ρ→ ,  n M →∞ and at the linear equilibrium in Proposition 1 we 
have that  n a0 → ,  n c1 / →− β,  n b →α β /  and the equilibrium collapses in the limit. In 
fact, the supply function of a firm converges to the demand function  () xp =α − β / . 
 
Another particular case is when the signals are pure noise (i.e. 
22
εθ σ σ= ∞ / ) then there is 
always a linear equilibrium (even when  1 ρ = ). The equilibrium is given by 
 
( ) ( ) nn Xp cp = −θ  
 















To see this note that if 
22










=−θ +λ =− θ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎝⎠
. 
 
When  1 ρ<  and
22
εθ σσ → ∞ /  (in  which  case  ( ) n Mn / 1 →ρ −ρ ) the equilibrium in 
Proposition 1 also collapses since  n a0 →  (but there is a linear equilibrium in the limit as 
given above –which does not coincide with the limit of the equilibrium in Proposition 1 
as 
22
εθ σσ → ∞ /  ).  
   14
With private values (i.e. perfect signals with 
2 0 ε σ = ) the price reveals  n θ    and firm i 
already knows its cost  i θ . In this case  n M0 = and the equilibrium is independent of  . ρ  
 
Comparative statics 
The slope of supply  n c  may be negative if costs shocks are correlated ( 0 ρ> ) and signals 
not perfect (
2 0 ε σ> ). The price serves a dual role as index of scarcity and as conveyor of 
information. Indeed, a high price has a direct effect to increase the competitive supply of 
a firm, but also conveys news that costs are high. If ρ = 0 or 
22 /0 εθ σ σ=  then the price 
conveys no extra information on the costs of firm i and  n c > 0. As we have seen, this is 
the case also when there is no private information (i.e. signals are pure noise, 
22
εθ σσ = ∞ / ). 
 
As  ρ  or 
22 / εθ σσ   increase then the slope of the supply function becomes steeper ( n c 
decreases) because of the informational component of the price (i.e. the firm learns more 
from the price about its cost shock and reacts less to a price change than if the price was 
only an index of scarcity) and turns negative at some point. Indeed, it is easily checked 
that  n c  decreases in ρ and
22 / εθ σσ . This follows from the fact that the largest root of the 
quadratic equation determining  n c  decreases with n M  and  n M  is in turn increasing in ρ 
and
22 / εθ σσ . Note that as 
2
ε σ  increases the private signal of a firm diminishes its precision 
in a one-to-one fashion while the precision in the price diminishes according to the 
factor () 1/ n 1 − . As ρ tends to 1,  n c  becomes negative. There are particular parameter 
combinations (i.e. when  ()
1 11
n Mn
− −− =+ λ β ) for which the scarcity and informational 
effects balance and firms set a zero weight ( n c0 = ) on public information. In this case 
firms do not condition on the price and the model reduces to the Cournot model where 
firms compete in quantities. However, in this particular case, when supply functions are 
allowed, not reacting to the price (public information) is optimal.  
   15
The comparative statics results are reminiscent of asymmetric information models where 
traders submit steeper schedules to protect themselves against adverse selection (Kyle 
(1989), Biais, Martimort, Rochet (2000)). Kyle (1989) and Wang and Zender (2002) 
consider a common value model with noise. Biais et al. (2000) in a common value 
environment show that adverse selection reduces the aggressiveness of competition in 
supply schedules of risk neutral uninformed market makers facing a risk averse informed 
trader who is subject also to an endowment shock. The phenomenon is akin to the 
winner’s curse in common value auctions (Milgrom and Weber (1982)): a bidder refrains 
from bidding aggressively because winning conveys the news that the signal the bidder 
has received was too optimistic (the highest signal in the pool). In our model a firm 
refrains from competing aggressively with its supply function because a high price 
conveys the bad new that costs are high. It is worth emphasizing that in the auction 
models of Kyle (1989) or Wang and Zender (2002) the demand schedules always have 
the “right” slope: downwards. Furthermore, in the double auction context of Kyle (1989) 
a linear equilibrium exists only if the number of informed traders is larger or equal than 3 
(when there are no uninformed traders). This is so since the market breaks down when 
traders submit vertical schedules. In our model with strategic agents facing a demand 
function from passive consumers this does not happen.  
 
Applications 
In the pollution damage interpretation of the shock, and when the equilibrium calls for a 
downward sloping supply, we would have that when firms see the price going up they 
reduce supply because they figure out that the assessed pollution damage will be higher.  
 
Patterns of pricing for airline flights have proved difficult to explain with extant 
theoretical models (see e.g. McAfee and te Velde (2006)). If we believe that supply 
function competition provides a suitable reduced form for pricing in such markets then 
taking into account the information aggregation role of price may help explaining some 
pricing patterns.13 We have seen that when the information role of the price dominates is 
                                                 
13   See Section 10.1 in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) for a description of airline pricing. For example, the 
authors state (p. 523): “A typical booking process proceeds as follows. An airline posts availability in   16
index of scarcity role then supply is downward sloping. If this is the case the 
interpretation would be that when airlines see prices going up they may infer, correctly, 
that the opportunity cost is high (i.e. that expected next period demand is high) and they 
reduce supply in the present period to be able to supply next period at a higher profit. In 
any case, when the variance of the (opportunity) cost shock increases the equilibrium 
reaction of firms is to set a flatter supply schedule inducing lower margins. Higher 
volatility of demand would translate then in lower margins.  
 
Increasing the noise in the private signal 
2
ε σ  makes the slope of supply steeper (decreases 
n c ). This result may help explain the fact that in the Texas balancing market small firms 
use steeper supply functions than those predicted by theory (Hortaçsu and Puller (2006)). 
Indeed, smaller firms may have signals of worse quality because of economies of scale in 
information gathering while private cost information has not been taken into account in 
the estimation.  
 
Competitiveness 
From the F.O.C. we have that  
 
() ()
ii i i 1
n
1




−⎡ θ ⎤ + λ= ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ β+ − ⎝⎠
, 
 
where the slope of residual demand is  ( )
1
n nn 1 c
− β+ − . We see therefore that the 
competitiveness of the LBSFE depends on the slope of supply  n c . A consequence of the 
comparative statics results is that the margin over expected marginal cost 
ii i Es , p x ⎡θ ⎤+λ ⎣⎦  is increasing in 
2
ε σ  and  ρ . Using simulations it can be checked that the 
aggregate slope of supply of rivals of a firm ( ) n n1 c −  increases (i.e. becomes flatter) 
                                                                                                                                                 
each fare class to the reservation systems stating the availability of seats in each fare class.” This is not 
unlike a supply function.    17
with n whenever  n c  > 0 for any n and that  ( )
1
n nn 1 c
− β+ −  is increasing in n always. It 
follows that the margin is decreasing in n. 14 
 
A similar relation holds for the margin over average expected marginal cost  
[] ()
nn
nn i i i i i n i1 i1
11
EM C E s , p x E s , p x
nn













where  () nn p/ x η= β  is the elasticity of demand.  
 
A Bayesian Cournot equilibrium, where firm i sets a quantity contingent only on its 
information  { } i s , corresponds to  n c0 =  with  a  margin  n 1/nη   (the unique Bayesian 
Cournot equilibrium is derived formally in Proposition A.1 in Appendix II). The supply 
function and the Cournot equilibrium coincide when  ( )
1 11
n Mn
− −− =+ λ β, in which case 
n c0 =  (indeed, then it can be checked that 
Cournot SF
nn aa =  and 
Cournot SF
nn b b = ). 
 
When  n c0 >   we are in the usual case in which the supply function equilibrium has 
positive slope and is between the Cournot and the competitive outcomes (e. g. Klemperer 
and Meyer (1989) when uncertainty has unbounded support). However, when  n c0 <  the 
margin is larger than the Cournot level and, in fact, converges to the collusive level  n 1/η  
when 1 ρ→  (this is so since  ( ) () n nn 1 c1 +β− →  as  1 ρ → ). It is remarkable that firms 
                                                 
14    Another possible pattern is for () n n1 c −   to have a hump-shaped form with n being positive and 
increasing first to become decreasing and eventually negative. (
n c  may increase or decrease with n.) 
Simulations have been performed for the range of parameters 
2
ε σ  and
2
θ σ  in { } 0.1,1,10 and  β  and 
{ } 1,10 λ∈ , setting α  and  θ  so as to control the probability that negative prices and/or quantities 
occur  (say, letting,  10 α=  and  5 θ=  or   30 α =  and  15 θ = ).   18
may approach collusive margins in a one-shot noncooperative equilibrium because of 
informational reasons. 
 
In some cases the rules of the market force supply functions to be nondecreasing. If this 
is the case and if the equilibrium unrestricted supply were to be downward sloping then 
the restricted equilibrium would be of the Cournot type with firms submitting vertical 
schedules. This implies that the market power of firms is capped at the Cournot level.  
 
The following proposition summarizes results so far. 
 
Proposition 2. At the LBSFE, with ρ < 1 and 
22
εθ σ σ< ∞ / , the slope of equilibrium supply 
is steeper ( n c  smaller) with increases in ρ  and 
22
ε θ σ σ / , going from  n c0 >  for ρ = 0 or 
2 0 ε σ=  to  n c0 <  for large values of ρ  or 
22
ε θ σ σ / .  As  1 ρ→  the margin over average 
expected marginal cost tends to the collusive level. 
 
 
Free entry  
The replica market considered can be the outcome of free entry in a market parameterized 
by size. Consider a market with m consumers (the size of the market) and inverse demand 
() mm PX X =α−β  where m /m β= β . Suppose now that at a first stage firms decide 
whether to enter the market or not. If a firm decides to enter it pays a fixed cost F > 0. At 
a second stage each active firm i, upon observing its signal i s , sets an output level. Given 
that n firms have entered, a Bayesian Supply Function equilibrium is realized. Given our 
assumptions, for any n there is a unique, and symmetric, linear equilibrium yielding 
expected profits  [] () () () ()
2
nn i En 2 / 2 n E X s , p ⎡ ⎤ π=λ + β ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
  for each firm. A free entry 
equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game. A subgame-perfect 
equilibrium requires that for any entry decisions at the first stage, a Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium in supply functions obtains at the second stage. Given a market of size m, the 
free entry number of firms  ( )
* nm  is approximated by the solution to  [ ] n EF π= 
(provided F is not so large to prevent any entry). It can be checked that  ()
* nm  is of the   19
same order as m (similarly as in Vives (2002)). This means that the ratio of consumers to 
firms is bounded away from zero and infinity for any market size. We can reinterpret, 





4. Welfare analysis 
In order to assess the welfare loss due to strategic behavior we characterize price-taking 
equilibria. We complement the analysis comparing with the performance of Bayesian 
Cournot equilibria. 
 
4.1 Price-taking equilibria and deadweight losses 
Full (shared) information competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal and characterized by 
the equality of price and expected marginal cost (with full information): 
 
iin i pE s , s x =⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  ,  i = 1, .., n. 
 
The implied allocation is symmetric (since the total surplus optimization problem is 
strictly concave and firms and information structure are symmetric) and, provided that 
1 ρ< , 
2 0 θ σ> and 
2
ε σ< ∞ , it is implemented by a symmetric price-taking LBSFE (denoted 
by a superscript “c” –for competitive– on the coefficients). The equilibrium strategy will 
be of the form  ()
cc c c
ni n n i n Xs , p b a s c p =− +   and it will arise out of the maximization of 
expected profits of firm i taking prices as given but using the information contained in the 
price. That is, firm i chooses  i x  to maximize 
()
2
ii i ii i E s,p x p E s,p x
2
λ
⎡π ⎤ = − ⎡θ ⎤ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . 
This will yield the following system of F.O.C. 
 
ii i pE s , p x =⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  for i = 1, .., n, 
   20
where  () ( )
1 cc c
nn n n p1c b a s
−
=+ β α − β+ β  provided  that 
c
n 1c0 +β≠ . In the linear 
equilibrium we obtain 
c
n 1c0 +β ≠   > 0 and 
c
n a0 > . Therefore, p reveals  n s  , 
ii iin Es , pEs , s ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦   , and the price-taking LBSFE implements the efficient solution.  
 
Indeed, similarly as in the proof of Proposition 1 it can be checked that the coefficients of 
the equilibrium strategy  ()
cc c c




























σ+ − ρσ ⎪
⎪
β− α σ ⎪−θ − λ = λ ⎨
β σ+ + − ρσ ⎪
⎪
+β ⎛⎞ ⎪ −λ = λ ⎜⎟ ⎪ β ⎝⎠ ⎩
 
where n M  is as in Section 3.  
 
The following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 3. In the n-firm market with ρ < 1 and 
22
εθ σ σ< ∞ / , there is a unique 
symmetric price-taking LBSFE. It is given by   ( )
cc c c
ni n n i n Xs , p b a s c p =− +  with 
()
() () () () ()
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n 1c +β > 0 and 
c
n a0 >   and that we may have also 
c
n c   < 0.  As before the 
equilibrium supply function can be upward or downward sloping. It will be downward 
sloping when the reaction to private information is small (i.e. when we are close to the 
common value case, when prior uncertainty is low or noise in the signals is high).    21
We have that 
c
n c  strictly decreases with n provided ρ > 0 (the result follows since 
c
n c i s  
strictly decreasing in  n Ma n d   n M can be shown to be strictly increasing in n if ρ > 0). The 
reason that the supply function at a price-taking LBSFE is steeper as n grows is that with 
larger n the price has better information about costs (and this matters if ρ > 0).  When ρ = 
0 we have that  n M =   0 ,  
c
n c1 / = λ , and 
cc
nn b a = −θ   (in this case, obviously, 
()
1
ii i xp E s
− =λ − ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ).  
 
For ρ < 1, and 
22
εθ σσ < ∞ / , the supply function of a firm in the price-taking equilibrium 











⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ β ⎜⎟ −= λ − + λ +> ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 
since in equilibrium  () n nn 1 c 0 +β − >   . Similarly, we obtain that
c
nn b b0 −> provided 
that 
2 0 ε σ> . It is immediate also that firms are more cautious responding to their private 














⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −ρ σ β ⎜⎟ −= λ − + λ > ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎜⎟ σ+ − ρσ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
 
This is because of the usual effect of market power: A firm takes into account the price 
impact coming from his production. Note that in principle a firm with market power 
would also be cautious because of the informational leakage from his action, but here the 
equilibrium is revealing. The simulations also uncover that price volatility is always 
larger in the competitive case. 
 
The (expected) deadweight loss at the LBSFE is the difference between (per capita) 
expected total surplus at the LBSFE ( n ETS ) and at the price-taking LBSFE (
c
n ETS ), 
()
c
nn ETS ETS /n − . It can be shown (see Appendix I) that   22
() ( ) ( ) ( )
22 cc c
nn n n i n i n ETS ETS n E x x E x x 2 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ β−+ λ− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
   - /   = / . 
 
The deadweight loss is due to market power. Simulations show that a typical case is for 
the deadweight loss to be an increasing function of ρ and of 
2
ε σ  (with  n ETS  decreasing 
and 
c
n ETS  U-shaped inρ , and with both  n ETS  and 
c
n ETS  decreasing in 
2
ε σ ).15 This is 
true both for the part of the deadweight loss corresponding to allocative inefficiency as 
well as the one corresponding to productive inefficiency (see the decomposition in 
Appendix I). This is consistent with the result that as  1 ρ→   and we approach the 
common value case margins tend to the collusive level. It also found that the deadweight 
loss decreases as the market gets large (i.e. with n). (See Figure 1a, b).  
 
However, other patterns are possible and the deadweight loss may be decreasing in ρ. 
This happens, for example, when 4, 0.5 β =λ = , 20 θ = , 45 α = , and 
22 0.2, 10 εθ σ =σ = . In 
this case 
c
n ETS  falls with ρ more quickly than n ETS . 
 
As we increase ρ the distance between the LBSFE and its price-taking counterpart may 
increase or decrease. There are several effects to consider. First, increasing ρ decreases 
n c  (i.e. makes the LBSFE less competitive) and this tends to increase both 
c
nn aa −  and 
c
nn cc −  for given value of ρ. Second, the very increase of ρ, for a given  n c , reduces 
c
nn aa −  and 
c
nn cc −  (the latter since  n M  is monotone increasing in ρ). The second effect 
is due to the fact that increases in ρ make reliance on private information less important. 
Finally, there is another effect on expected total surplus via the variability of the average 
cost parameter n var⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦
  . This third effect has nothing to do with information and is 
highlighted in the private values case 
2 (0 ) ε σ =   where both competitive and strategic 
                                                 
15  The parameters considered systematically for the simulation are 10 α =  and  5 θ=  or    30 α=  and 
15 θ= , and  { } ,1 , 1 0 βλ∈ , and  { }
22 , 0.1,1,10
θε σσ ∈ . 
   23
equilibria are independent of ρ. In this case increasing ρ decreases the deadweight loss 
since 
c

























Figure 1a. Deadweight loss as a function of ρ  (with parameters 1 β =λ= , 5 θ= ,  10 α= , 
and 
22 1 εθ σ= σ=). 
 
 
                                                 
16  The likely reason is that increasing ρ increases  [ ] n var θ   and this increases the variance of average 
output, which in turn decreases expected total surplus (expected consumer surplus increases, and 
expected profits decrease, with higher average output variability since then consumers get lower prices 
when they consume more; the profit decrease dominates the consumer surplus increase). The 
differential effect on the competitive surplus is due to the fact that the competitive output is more 
sensitive to costs and therefore the impact on output variability of the increase in ρ larger. 
























Figure 1b. Deadweight loss as a function of 
2
ε σ  (with parameters n = 5, 
1 β=λ= , 5 θ= , 10 α= , and 
2 1 θ σ=). 
 
 
4.2 Comparison with Cournot 
The welfare evaluation of the LBSFE is in marked contrast with the Bayesian Cournot 
equilibrium. In contrast to the Cournot case, at the LBSFE there is only a deadweight loss 
due to market power but not due to private information. There is always a welfare loss at 
the price-taking Bayesian Cournot equilibrium because the Cournot market mechanism 
does not aggregate information. However, a price-taking Bayesian Cournot equilibrium is 
team optimal (i.e. maximizes total expected surplus subject to the constraint that firms 
use decentralized -quantity- strategies in information, see Vives (1988)). 
 
It is worth to compare the relative efficiency of the Cournot market (
Cournot
n ETS ) in 
relation to the supply function market (
SF
n ETS ) in per capita terms. A typical pattern for 
moderate n is for ()
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n −  to be positive for ρ close to zero and negative 
for ρclose to 1, being zero at the point for which the supply function equilibrium calls 
for a vertical supply. For larger n we may have ( )
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − >  all along. (See   25
Figure 2.) In fact, for a given ρ   and for large n we have always that 
()
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 −> . (See Figure 3.) Furthermore, when signals are perfect 
(
2 0 ε σ= ) we have also that ()
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − >  always. When signals are close to 
perfect we have that ()
SF Cournot




















Figure 2. Efficiency differential between supply function and Cournot equilibria as a 
function of ρ (with parameters 1 β=λ= , 5 θ = , 10 α = , and 
22 1 εθ σ =σ = ). 
 




















Figure 3. Efficiency differential between supply function and Cournot equilibria as a 
function of n (with parameters 1 β=λ= , 5 θ = , 10 α = , and 
22 1 εθ σ =σ = ). 
 
The intuition for the results should be clear. The supply function market always 
dominates in efficiency in terms of information because firms have full information while 
in the Cournot market they do not. For 
2 0 ε σ =  or ρ small the supply function market 
dominates overall because on top firms have less market power (since supply functions 
slope upwards). The result is that 
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS 0 − >  for 
2 0 ε σ =  or  ρ  small.  For 
larger  ρ  and 
2 0 ε σ> , when supply functions slope downwards, firms in the supply 
function market have more market power and this may dominate the information effect 
for n low, with the result that 
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS 0 − < . At the critical value of ρ for which 
the supply function equilibrium calls for a vertical supply we have 
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS 0 −=  
since then both equilibria coincide. For n larger the market power effect is not very 
important and the information effect dominates and we have that 
()
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 −>  always.  
 
For n large, for a fixed ρ, we must have ( )
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − >  since as n grows the 
supply function equilibrium converges to the (full information) first best but not the   27
Cournot equilibrium. At the LBSFE there is only a deadweight loss due to market power, 
which dissipates in a large market; at the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium the deadweight 
loss due to private information remains in a large market (see Section 5 for the formal 
results). 
 
The comparison between the Cournot and supply function outcomes has practical 
implications. First when a supply function market is modeled, for convenience, à la 
Cournot we want to know what biases are introduced. Second, when firms are restricted 
to use upward sloping schedules they may end up using vertical ones when in the supply 
function equilibrium they would be called to use downward sloping ones. The restriction 
to upward sloping schedules caps the market power of firms in the supply function 
market.  
 
With respect to the first issue, recall that at the LBSFE there is only a deadweight loss 
due to market power but not due to private information. The result is that in a market 
characterized by supply function competition using the Cournot model overestimates the 
welfare loss with respect to the actual supply function mechanism on two counts when 
supply function slope upwards: excessive market power and lack of information 
aggregation. When the equilibrium supply function slopes downwards the Cournot 
market underestimates market power and then the comparison is ambiguous: the Cournot 
market may under- or overestimate the deadweight loss in relation to supply function 
competition. In a large market, as we will see in the next section, the Cournot model 
always overestimates the welfare loss since at the LBSFE there is (almost) no efficiency 
loss while there is a significant one with Cournot competition due to private information. 
 
With respect to the second issue, forcing firms to use increasing schedules when they 
would like to use decreasing ones may or not may be a good idea depending basically on 
the number of firms. It will be good when the number of firms (and size of the market) is 
moderate.  
 
   28
 
5. Convergence properties 
We show next how equilibria in finite economies become price-taking. We characterize 
the rates of convergence and the order of magnitude of the deadweight loss at the LBSFE. 
 
Before stating the convergence results we will recall some measures of speed of 
convergence. We say that the sequence (of real numbers)  n b  is of the order n
υ, with υ a 
real number, whenever  n n nb k
−υ ⎯⎯ → for some nonzero constant k. We say that the 
sequence of random variables { } n y  converges  in  mean square to zero at the rate 
r 1/ n (or that  n y  is of the order 
r 1/ n ) if  ()
2
n Ey ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦ converges to zero at the rate 




⎣⎦   is of the order 
r 1/n ). Given that  () [] ( ) []
2 2
nnn Ey E y v a r y ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ , a 
sequence { } n y  such that  [ ] n Ey = 0 and  [ ] n var y  is of the order of 1/n, converges to zero 
at the rate 1/ n .  
 




= θ≡ θ ∑  , then  n θ− θ   converges (in mean square) to 0 at the rate of 1/ n  
because  n E0 ⎡⎤ θ− θ= ⎣⎦
  and 
2
n var /n θ ⎡⎤ θ= σ ⎣⎦
 . In our case  n θ   is normally distributed with 
mean  θ  and () ()
2
n var 1 n 1 /n θ ⎡⎤ θ=+−ρ σ ⎣⎦
 . We have therefore that  n θ→ θ   in  mean 
square at the rate 1/ n  where θ   is normally distributed with mean θ and variance 
2
θ ρσ .  
 
The following proposition characterizes the convergence of the LBSFE to a price-taking 
equilibrium as the market grows. As we have seen before the price-taking equilibrium is 
first best efficient since it aggregates information. 
 
Proposition 4. As the market grows large the market price  n p  (at the LBSFE) converges 
in mean square to the price-taking Bayesian price 
c
n p   at the rate of 1/n . (That is,   29
()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
  tends to 0 at the rate of 
2 1/n .) The deadweight loss at the LBSFE 
()
c
nn ETS ETS /n −  is of the order of 
2 1/n . 
 
The results follow because 
c
nn aa − , 
c
nn b b − , and 
c
nn cc −  are at most of the order of 1/n 
and both  n p  and 
c
n p  depend on the average signal  n s  . (See Appendix I.)  
 
The rate of convergence to price taking behavior is 1/n, which is the same as the usual 
rate under complete information. The departure from price taking (marginal cost) is of the 
order of 1/n and the deadweight loss is of the order of the square of it. This result should 
not be surprising since the LBSFE aggregates information. Cripps and Swinkels (2006) 
obtain a parallel result in a double auction environment. The authors consider a 
generalized private value setting where bidders can be asymmetric and can demand or 
supply multiple units. Under some regularity conditions (and a weak requirement of “a 
little independence” where each player’s valuation has a small idiosyncratic component), 
they find that as the number of players n grows (say that there are n buyers and n sellers) 
all nontrivial equilibria of the double auction converge to the competitive outcome and 
inefficiency vanishes at the rate of 
2 1/n
−α for any  0 α > .  
 
It follows from the simulations also that typically the speed of convergence of the 
deadweight loss to zero (in terms of the constant of convergence) is slower when ρ is 
larger. That is, the limit as n tends to infinity of  ( )
c
nn nE T S E T S − is increasing with ρ. 
(This is so since we have seen that ( )
c
nn ETS ETS −  is typically increasing in ρ for any n 
and the limit of  ()
c
nn nE T S E T S − is well defined .) 
 
At the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium Proposition 4 holds (with the important proviso that 
now  ()
c
nn ETS ETS /n −   is the deadweight loss with respect to the price-taking 
equilibrium but not with respect to the full information first best). The price-taking 
Bayesian Cournot equilibrium coincides with full information first best in a large   30
economy only in the independent values case, where there is no aggregate uncertainty 
(see Vives (2002)). Otherwise, as the market grows large there is no convergence to a full 
information equilibrium.  
 
In summary, convergence to price-taking is, in both cases, at the rate of 1/n for prices 
and 
2 1/n  for the welfare loss with respect to price-taking behavior. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have examined supply function competition with private information and 
compared it with the Cournot model. While in some markets the supply function model is 
closer to the institutional set up it is often the case that the Cournot model is used instead. 
The reason is that the Cournot model is easier to handle and quite robust. The question 
arises then on the nature of the biases introduced by the Cournot model in this situation. 
In our linear-normal model we have found that there is a unique symmetric linear 
Bayesian supply function equilibrium. The equilibrium is privately revealing with the 
private signal of the firm and the price being sufficient statistics of the join information in 
the market for the firm. This means that the incentives to acquire information are 
preserved.  
 
Supply functions may slope downwards when the information role of the price 
overwhelms its traditional index of scarcity role. This may help explain odd pricing 
patterns. Furthermore, we find that an increase in the correlation of cost parameters or in 
the noise in private signals makes supply functions steeper when upward sloping and 
increases price-cost margins always. This implies that ignoring private cost information 
with supply function competition may explain supply slopes that look “too high”. For 
example, in the Texas balancing market small firms may use steeper supply functions 
than those predicted by theory (Hortaçsu and Puller (2006)) since small firms have 
signals of worse quality because of economies of scale in information gathering.  
 
The result may have regulatory and competition policy implications since the observation 
of high margins may be taken as an indication of excessive market power or collusion   31
(coordinated behavior) when in fact it may be explained by poor information of the part 
of firms. Indeed, close to the common value situation margins will approach the collusive 
level and the deadweight loss will increase. However, from the competition policy 
perspective it is useless in this market to go after coordinated behavior since firms are 
just adjusting noncooperatively to private information. It may be useful instead to cap the 
market power of firms (e.g. requiring them to use upward sloping schedules). This will 
improve welfare in markets of moderate size and number of firms.  
 
The welfare analysis provides a stark contrast between Cournot and supply function 
equilibria. Indeed, the Cournot model overestimates the welfare loss with respect to an 
actual supply function mechanism on two counts when supply functions are upward 
sloping: excessive market power and lack of information aggregation. The Cournot 
model displays too high margins and an increased welfare loss since firms only rely on 
their private information. When supply functions slope downwards then Cournot 
underestimates the market power of firms and the comparison is ambiguous: the Cournot 
market may under- or overestimate the deadweight loss in relation to supply function 
competition. In both the supply function and Cournot models the order of magnitude of 
the distortion because of strategic behavior is 1/n in prices and 
2 1/n  in the deadweight 
loss where n is the number of firms (and size of the market). This result provides a 
measure of the competitiveness of the market. The difference is that in a large market at 
the supply function equilibrium there is no efficiency loss while there is with Cournot 
competition due to private information. 
 
Several extensions may be worth pursuing. Among them, the consideration of 
asymmetric firms (and merger analysis), the introduction of forward contracts, and costly 
information acquisition. 
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Appendix I: Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider a candidate linear equilibrium 
() ni n n i n Xs , p b a s c p =− + . Positing  n 1c0 +β> , the price equation 
() ( )
1
nn n n p1c b a s
− =+ β α − β+ β  










β ∑ . 
The pair () i s ,p  is informationally equivalent to the pair ( ) ii s ,h , hence 
ii ii i Es , pEs , h ⎡θ⎤ = ⎡ θ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . 




















⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ θσσ − ρ σ
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
θσ σ + σ − ρ σ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟




where  () () () ( )
22 2 n1 n1n2 ε θ θ ψ= − σ +σ + − − ρ σ . We obtain 
() ()
()() () ()
() () () () () () () () () ()
2
i
ii i ii 22
22 2 22
ii 22 2 2 22 2 2
h








θε θ ε θε θ ε
σ ⎡⎤
⎡θ ⎤ = θ = θ+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ − σ+− ρ + σ ⎣⎦
σσ − ρ + −ρ + σ σσρ
+
σ − ρ+ σ σ + − ρ+ σ σ − ρ+ σ σ + − ρ+ σ
 
 




pE s , p x
nn 1 c
⎛⎞ β
−⎡ θ ⎤ = + λ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎝⎠
  and the expression for  i h   we obtain the 
following  
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() () () ()
() () () () ()
( )( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
() ()
() () () () () () ()
22 2 22 2 2 2
nn
i 2 2 22 2 2 22
22
nn
nn in 22 2 2
n
11 n 1 1n b a
s
11 n 1 11 n 1
n1c a
1p b a s c p
nn 1 c 11 n 1
θε θ εε θ θ ε
εθ ε θεθ ε θ
θε
εθ ε θ
−ρ σ σ + + − ρ σ σσ +− ρ σθ + σ σρ β − αβ
−−
σ+ − ρσ σ+ + − ρσ σ+ − ρσ σ+ + − ρσ
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Identifying coefficients, letting
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, we obtain 





















nn 1 c 1
Mb
b
nn 1 c 1n 1
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⎪ =+ λ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − σ+ − ρσ ⎪ ⎝⎠
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⎪ ⎛⎞ β− α σ β ⎪−θ + λ − = ⎜⎟ ⎨ ⎜⎟ +β − β σ+ + − ρσ ⎝⎠ ⎪
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This characterizes linear equilibria. The last equation is quadratic in c of the form 
() gc=0 with 




g c n11Mc n1M n1 M c n n .
⎛⎞
=λβ − + + β+λ + + − λ −β + β+λ − ⎜⎟ β ⎝⎠
 
For n10 −> can write it as  ()
2 fc c c 0 = +Σ +Λ=  where 






β+λ +λ − +β
Σ=β Λ+
βλ − +










. (For n = 1 there is a 
unique solution to the quadratic equation.) The function  ( ) f ⋅  is convex. Let
2 4 ∆≡Σ − Λ. 
It can be checked that  0 ∆>  and therefore the equation has two real roots and only the 
largest root  n c  is compatible with the second order condition.  
 








− =< ⎜⎟ βλ β− + ⎝⎠
 and 
therefore for the largest root we have  n c1 / >− β  because of convexity of  ( ) f ⋅ .   34
Furthermore,  n a0 > . This is so since from the expression for  n a   in the system of 






=+ λ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎝⎠
. Since n c1 β >−   it follows that 
() () n nn 1 c n n 1 1 0 +β − > − − = > . It is immediate also that the largest root decreases 
with  n M s i n c e   n f/ M 0 ∂∂ >. Finally, it is immediate to check from the solution to the 




n c is strictly decreasing in n if ρ > 0 











. It is immediate that 
c
n c   is strictly decreasing 












⎛⎞ σ+ − ρσ ρσ ∂ ⎜⎟ =>
⎜⎟ ∂− ρ σ+ + − ρσ ⎝⎠
.♦ 
 
In order to perform welfare comparisons we will need the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma. Comparison of regimes with symmetric strategies and information structure. The 
difference in (per capita) ETS between a price-taking regime R and another regime with 
strategies based on less information (that is, on a weakly coarser information partition) is 
given by  
() ( ) ( ) ( )
22 RR R
nn i ni n ETS ETS n E x x E x x 2 ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ β−+ λ− ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
   -  /   = / . 
 
 
The result follows considering a Taylor series expansion of TS (stopping at the second 
term due to the quadratic nature of the payoff) around price-taking equilibria. The key to 
simplify the computations is to notice that at price-taking equilibria total surplus is 
maximized.  
 
Allocative and productive inefficiency. Consider a symmetric information structure. We 
can decompose the total inefficiency of a regime with symmetric strategies with respect 
to a price-taking regime R in terms of allocative and productive inefficiency. Let 
ii nn uxx ≡−  and 
RR
ii nn vx x ≡− . Then we can show that    35
() () () () ( )
2 2 RR
nn ii ETS ETS /n E x x E u v /2 ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= β + λ − + λ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
, 
where  () ()
2 R
nn Ex x / 2 ⎡⎤ β+λ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
  corresponds to allocative inefficiency (loss in surplus 
when producing, in a cost-minimizing way, an average output  n x   different from the 
benchmark 
R
n x ) and  ()
2
ii Eu v / 2 ⎡⎤ λ− ⎣⎦   to productive inefficiency (production of an 
average output in a non cost-minimizing way). The decomposition follows noting that if 
average outputs  n x  and 
R
n x  are produced in a cost minimizing way then for all i, then 
RR
in in n n xxxx −=−. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us show first the order for the price difference 
() () ( )
2 2 cc c
nn nn nn Ep p v a rp p E p p ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − + − ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
. We have that 
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+β − + β − − − 
 
The terms  [ ] n Es   and [ ] n var s  are of the order of a constant. Therefore, the order of 
()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
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 , which is of order1/n; 
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⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ β ⎜⎟ −= + λ− λ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, which is of order 1/n (note that  n Mi s  
of the order of a constant). We conclude that  ()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 is of the order of 
2 n / 1 s i n c e  
it is a quadratic function of the terms ( )
c
nn aa − , ( )
c
nn b b −  and ( )
c
nn cc − .  
 
We deal now with the order of magnitude of ( )
c
nn ETS ETS /n −  using the lemma above. 
We have that () ()
22 c1 c
nn nn Ex x Ep p
− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= β − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
  , since  nn px = α−β  and 
cc
nn px =α−β , 
and we know from the first part that this is of order 
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and the first term is of order 
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All the terms are of order 1/n and therefore  ()
2
c
in in Ex x ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦  is of order 
2 1/n . We have 
 
() ( ) ( )
cc c c c
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For the first summand we know that ( )
2 c
nn aa −  is of the order of 
2 1/n  and  [ ] i var s  is a 
constant. For the second summand, it is immediate that the two terms in the bracket are of 
the order of 
2 1/n  while   [ ] n var s   is of the order of a constant. The conclusion follows.♦ 
 
 
Appendix II: Cournot competition 
 
Cournot competition 
Consider the market exactly as before but now firm i sets a quantity contingent on its 
information { } i s .17 The firm has no other source of information and, in particular, does 
not condition on the price. The expected profits of firm i conditional on receiving signal 
si and assuming firm j, j ≠ i, uses strategy  jj X (s ), are 
( ) ( )
2




⎡π ⎤ = − ⎡θ ⎤ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑ . 
 
 From the F.O.C. of the optimization of a firm we obtain 
() ii i i pE s x x
n
β
−⎡ θ⎤ + λ= ⎣⎦ . 
(Note that given that the profit function is strictly concave and the information structure 













nn i i i i i n i1 i1
11
EM C E s x E s x
nn
== ≡ ⎡ θ⎤ + λ= ⎡ θ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑∑  and  () nn p/ x η= β  . The 
margins are larger or smaller than in the supply function equilibrium case depending on 
whether the slope of supply  n c  is positive or negative since in the Cournot case they 
correspond to the case of  n c0 = .  
 
                                                 
17   See Vives (2002) for related results when cost parameters are i.i.d. and Vives (1988) for the common 
value case.   38
The following proposition characterizes the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium and the price-
taking Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (denoted by a superscript c). Both equilibria are 
different from their supply function counterparts (except in the knife-edge case for which 
n c0 = ) since there is no conditioning in the market price. We will abuse somewhat 
notation and we will use the same notation for parameters at the Cournot equilibrium than 
at the supply function one. 
 
Proposition A.1. There is a unique equilibrium and a unique price-taking Bayesian 
Cournot equilibrium. They are symmetric, and affine in the signals. Letting 
22 2 /( ) θθ ε ξ≡σ σ +σ  the strategies of the firms are given (respectively) by: 
 



































Proof: Drop the subscript n labeling the replica market and let  1 β = . We consider first the 
Bayesian Cournot equilibrium. We check that the candidate strategies form an 
equilibrium. The expected profits of firm i conditional on receiving signal si and 
assuming firm j, j ≠ i, uses strategy  ( ) j X ⋅ , are 
   () ii i j j i ii i ji
11
Esx Es E X s s x
nn 2
≠
⎛⎞ λ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ π= α − θ− − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑ . 
Then first order conditions (F.O.C.) yield 
() () ii i jj ii ji
11
2x s E s E X s s
n2 n
≠
λ ⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ += α − θ − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠ ∑ ,  for i = 1,..., n.   39
Plugging in the candidate equilibrium strategy and using the formulae for the conditional 
expectations for  ii Es ⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦ and ji Ess ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , 
 
() ii i Es s1 ⎡⎤ θ= ξ + − ξ θ ⎣⎦  and  ( ) ji ji i Ess E s s 1 ⎡⎤⎡⎤ = θ = ξρ + −ξρ θ ⎣⎦⎣⎦ , 
it is easily checked that they satisfy the F.O.C. (which are also sufficient in our model). 
To prove uniqueness we show that the Bayesian Cournot equilibria of our game are in 
one-to-one correspondence with the (person-by-person) optimization of an appropriately 
defined concave quadratic team function G. A team decision rule  () () ( ) 11 n n X s ,...,X s  is 
(person-by-person) optimal if it can not be improved upon by changing only one 
component  () i X ⋅ (i.e. each agent maximizes the team objective conditional on his 
information and taking as given the strategies of the other agents.) Let 
() () ( ) ii i Gx x f x − =π +  where 
() ()
2
kj ii j j j k j ji ji k,j i
11
fx x x x x
n2 2 n
≠ − ≠≠ ≠
λ ⎛⎞ α−θ − + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
=∑∑ ∑ . 
This yields  
() ()
2
jj j i j jj i j
11
Gx x x x x
n2 2 n
≠
λ ⎛⎞ =α − θ − + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑ . 
We obtain the same outcome by solving either 
i xi i max E s ⎡ ⎤ π ⎣ ⎦  or 
i xi max E G s ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  since 
() ii fx −  does not involve  i x.   
Note now that person-by-person optimization is equivalent in our context to the global 
optimization of the team function (since the random term does not affect the coefficients 
of the quadratic terms and the team function is concave in actions, Radner (1962, 
Theorem 4)). Invoke the result by Radner (1962, Theorem 5)), which implies that in our 
model, the components of the unique Bayesian team decision function of the equivalent   40
team problem are affine. Based on the above three observations we conclude that the 
affine Bayesian Cournot equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. 
A similar argument establishes the result for the Bayesian price-taking equilibrium. Then 
the F.O.C. for firm i is given by    
() () ii i jj ii j
1
Xs E s EXss
n
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ λ= α − θ − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∑
, 
and the solution is a (person-by-person) maximum of a team problem with an objective 
function which is precisely the ETS.  ♦ 
 
 
We consider, as before, convergence to price taking and its speed as the economy is 
replicated.  The following proposition characterizes the convergence of the Bayesian 
Cournot equilibrium to a price-taking equilibrium. ETS (
c
n ETS ) denotes here the 
expected total surplus at the (price-taking) Bayesian Cournot equilibrium. 
 
Proposition A.4. As the market grows large the market price  n p  at the Bayesian Cournot 
equilibrium converges in mean square to the price-taking Bayesian Cournot price 
c
n p  at 
the rate of 1/n. (That is,  ()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 tends to 0 at the rate of 
2 1/n .) The difference 
()
c
nn ETS ETS /n −  is of the order of 
2 1/n .  
 
Proof: Consider wlog the case 1 β= . 
Let ( )( ) ( )( )
cc c c
nn nnn n n n n n yppxx bb aas =−=−= − α − θ + − − θ   . Recall 
that () [] ()[]
2 2
nnn Ey E y v a r y ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ . We have that  [ ] ( )()
c
nn n Ey b b = −α − θ  because 
[ ] n Es =θ  . It is easily seen that ( )
c
nn b b − is of order 1/n (indeed,  ()
c
nn nb b −  tends to 
()
2
1/ 1+λ   as n tends to infinity). Therefore  [] ( )
2
n E y is of order 
2 1/n . Furthermore, 
[]() []
2 c
nn n n var y a a var s =−  . We have that  [ ] () ( ) ( )
22
n var s 1 n 1 /n θε =+− ρ σ + σ  , which is   41
of the order of a constant for  0 ρ>  (or 1/nfor 0 ρ = ), and that ( )
c
nn aa −  is of order 1/n 
(because  ()
c
nn na a − tends to  ()
2 − −ξ ρξ+λ as n tends to infinity). Therefore the order of 
[ ] n var y  is 
2 1/n  for  0 ρ>  (or 
3 1/n  for  0 ρ = ). We conclude that in any case the order of 
c
nn n ypp =− is 1/n. Consider ()
c
nn ETS ETS /n −  now. According to the Lemma above 
and given that equilibria are symmetric we have that 
() ( ) ( ) ()
22 cc c
n n n n in in ETS ETS /n E x x E x x /2 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= β − + λ − ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  . We have just shown 
()
2 c
nn Ex x ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
   to be of order
2 1/n . We have that 
() ()
2 2 cc c
in in in in in in Ex x E x x v a r x x ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤⎡⎤ −= −+ − ⎣⎦⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
. Now, 
c
in in Ex x ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦is of the same order 
as 
c
nn Ex x ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦  , 1/n, and  ( ) ( )
2 cc 2 2
in in n n var x x a a θ ε ⎡⎤ − =− σ + σ ⎣⎦ , is of order 
2 1/n  because 
()
c
nn aa −  is of order 1/n. Therefore,  ()
2 c
in in Ex x ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 is of order 
2 1/n . We conclude that 
()
c
nn ETS ETS /n − is of the order of 
2 1/n . ♦ 
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